

## Office Memorandum - UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

A/1 42346

TO : [REDACTED] A

DATE: 4 February 1953

FROM : [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] Request for a [REDACTED] contact - Artichoke

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1. [REDACTED] on 29 January requested [REDACTED] assistance in determining the proper contact within CIA for [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] explained that one of [REDACTED] supervisors had become concerned over the apparent authenticity of the statements made by American PW's in China concerning their participation in U. S. PW attacks. The thinking in the [REDACTED] office is that if the Communists have developed really effective "brain washing" techniques for application to American PW's, it may be necessary for the [REDACTED] to plan a large-scale reconditioning program. [REDACTED] has apparently been assigned the responsibility for making a preliminary study of all data available concerning the techniques used on American PW's and their reactions. He hoped to find someone in CIA who had been following this subject.

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2. [REDACTED] also stated that the [REDACTED] was interested in interviewing [REDACTED] reported by a White Russian New York paper to be [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] was referred to the undersigned and advised that it would not be possible for O/SI to supply the name of anyone who [REDACTED] could contact, and that the appropriate channel for [REDACTED] with CIA operational personnel was through [REDACTED] was promised, however, that O/SI would make an informal investigation which might result in the proper CIA personnel contacting either [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] directly and indicating a willingness to discuss [REDACTED] problem with him.

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4. On 3 February [REDACTED] Admin. received a request from [REDACTED] to arrange a conference between [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] to discuss this same problem. After checking with the undersigned, [REDACTED] informed [REDACTED] personnel that [REDACTED] request was being processed in O/SI but that it was O/SI's belief that a contact with someone other than [REDACTED] would be more valuable.

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5. A check with the Contact Division discloses that there has been no prior contact with [REDACTED] but that Medicine Division has recently levied requirements which will require a contact by the [REDACTED] office in the near future.

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6. If you will advise me as to the decision within the Anti-choke group as to how [REDACTED] request is to be handled, I will arrange to call [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] Hoff and, if appropriate, suggest that [REDACTED] arrange to levy requirements on [REDACTED] through O/CD.

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DEFENSE AGAINST SOVIET MEDICAL INTERROGATION  
AND ESPIONAGE TECHNIQUES

13-1150

A/B, 4, 23/47

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✓ 1. International treaties or other agreements never have controlled experimental development or actual use of unconventional methods of waging war, including devices for subversive use; fiendish acts in espionage; torture and murder of battle captives; of physical duress and other persuasive actions in interrogation of prisoners.

✓ 2. Our defense against these actions depends upon our knowledge of potential enemy capability. Evidence of experimental and actual use of interrogation techniques by the Soviets, in order to obtain intelligence and court confessions independent of the interrogatees' volition, highlights the need of intensive medical investigation.

✓ 3. The behavior of defendants at court trials in Russia (1) and her satellite countries (2), and the whole pattern of Soviet trial procedure in general, make it essential to investigate the use of drugs, hypnotism, hypno-narco-analysis, electric and drug shock and possibly the use of ultrasonics.

✓ 4. This proposed investigation appears to be more essential when documentary evidence leads to the belief that Russia has been conducting medical research on the subject, has actually used various techniques, and has made provision for large scale production of uncommon special drugs, (3) for their speech-producing effects on prisoners of war.

✓ 5. Adequate evidence is available to indicate that the Soviet has used physical duress and/or a large number of different drugs in their attempts to enhance results of standard psychiatric interrogation.

✓ 6. Evidence of subconscious isolation, amnesia, and destruction of mental function have been noted in some of the victims of Soviet methods.

H.B/6 Behavior patterns, rapport, symptoms of residual effects of treatments, and the physical condition of prisoners indicate the use of drugs for forced con-

fessions or [redacted] Details of the

treatment before trial of these [redacted] 73 other well known court cases are not available. Several documents (3) refer to memorized testimony and departure from text indicating forced false confessions.

VI. Evidence of the use of drugs for court trials and probable extensive use on war prisoners in the future, is supported by a report of a large plantation in Nikita Gardens and another plantation at Bakchisarai in the Crimea (4) devoted to the breeding and raising of subtropical plants for their speech producing effects. Sources report the use of an extract from the Nikita plant combined with an extract of a plant reported to be found only in Tashkent for speech producing effects.

IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET SUBTLETS TO STANDARD  
PSYCHIATRIC INTERROGATION

1. Physical duress has been used very extensively by the Russians.

✓ 2. Drugs can be used by the Soviet overtly or surreptitiously to produce a variety of effects, from physical discomfort such as exhaustion, to unconsciousness or death. Some would dull mental faculties so that automatic or mechanical responses would be given in answer to questions instead of reasoned answers. Others would induce loquaciousness or lower resistance against telling the truth. If the mental faculties have not been destroyed, these drugs should not result in amnesia of interrogations in most cases.

✓ 3. Soviet efforts to produce an efficacious drug indicate that Russia has been preparing to use a drug for intelligence purposes. Drugs could be administered in many ways by espionage personnel, and over an extensive combat area to obtain battle intelligence. An efficacious drug might win or lose battles. Very little training would be required to administer drugs for (a) interrogation purposes, (b) espionage intelligence trickery and (c) lethal doses for themselves or our personnel.

✓ 4. Hypnotism appears to have been used in some cases by the Soviet. It has the possibilities of (a) lowering resistance against telling the truth and (b) inducing specific action or behavior in the subject. In certain cases it would be possible for a skilled Russian operator to bring about condition (a) yet leave the subject with no specific recollection of having been interrogated. Under condition (b) it would be possible to brief an American, other prisoner or person, subsequently dispatch him on a mission, and successfully debrief him upon return without his recollection of the briefing or debriefing.

It requires skilled professional personnel to produce results, therefore this method of obtaining intelligence would be very limited in numbers as compared to the use of drugs, but should be far more effective in special cases.

✓ 5. Hypno-hypnosis. Susceptibility to hypnotism varies from person to person, but it is believed that skilled Russian operators can readily hypnotize about 25% of a group of persons. However, at least 80% of a group would be susceptible following administration of certain drugs which are available to the Russians. This technique could be used by the Russians for effective psychological warfare.

✓ 6. Electric and Drug Shock. Can easily be administered in various degrees, and could be used successfully by enemy operators for interrogation of prisoners. It is unlikely, up to the present time, that the Russians have developed a technique for inducing specific behavior in the subject for subversive acts following shock, but they probably could succeed in a large proportion of cases by combining shock and hypnosis.

✓ 7. Ultrasonics. No information is available as to Soviet use of ultrasonics for interrogation purposes, but their endeavor to use any possible method to accomplish results should initiate investigation of this possibility.

8. The Polygraph is in common use in many countries and probably is used by the Soviet.

1. Statement of the problem.
  - a. Collection of intelligence on methods and materials used by the enemy.
  - b. Preventive measures against the use of methods and materials.
  - c. Prevention of effects if used.
  - d. Differential diagnosis of effects.
  - e. Treatment of cases.
2. Facts bearing on the problem.
  - a. Physical duress is not only out of keeping with the traditions and humane principles of this country, but is generally known to be of dubious effectiveness. Control of enemy acts is impossible.
  - b. The use of drugs, hypno-narcosis, and electric shock are of primary importance.
  - c. Because of the subject under consideration it is essential to allocate specific kinds of investigation to highly specialized personnel who are absolutely sound in security. This subject should be discussed with especially selected persons only, and should not be presented to general committees such as the [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] as a group. Clearances should be obtained from the "eyes only" group which has a specific interest in this subject.

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3. Discussion. By agreement, research on some of the items has been under way for defense purposes, but it is inadequate in coverage of the subject. Certain kinds of work can be conducted in connection with routine psychiatric therapy, and with volunteers. The effects of many drugs have been observed in the treatment of many psychiatric patients, but our knowledge is deficient because a number of products have not been tested.

Hypno-narco-analysis has been effective but has not been fully exploited.

The results of shock treatments, especially electric shock are very encouraging. Reports show that experienced specialists could reveal recent use of electric shock, by proper interpretation in the use of the electroencephalograph.

4. Recommendations.

Our present knowledge should be extended by complete coverage of the following items, and coordination of all information including covert intelligence for the various agencies and armed services concerned.

- a. Collection of intelligence on methods and materials used by the enemy.
- b. Preventive measures against the use of methods and materials.
- c. Prevention of effects if used.
- d. Differential diagnosis of effects.
- e. Treatment of cases.